Joanna pacitti dating
Crestar Mortgage Corp., 109 F.3d 969, 974 (4th Cir.1997) (noting that arguing merits of issue in opening appellate brief puts appellee on notice as to that issue). Only one parent or legal guardian may accompany each participant.2.The “Annie” selected at the “Annie-Off-Final Callback” will be required to work with a trained dog.In February 1997, approximately three weeks before the scheduled Broadway opening, the producers informed Joanna that her “services [would] no longer be needed,” and she was replaced by her understudy. Macy's objected to their request, and the District Court limited discovery to “what promises, if any, were made by defendant prior to and at the final audition ․ in New York City that the person selected at that audition would appear in the role as Annie.” Id. Plaintiffs moved for reconsideration, and the District Court denied that motion on December 19, 1997. In their notice of appeal, plaintiffs specify only the District Court's order of August 19, 1998, granting summary judgment for Macy's. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c) states that the notice of appeal must “designate the judgment, order or part thereof appealed from.” Fed. Moreover, Macy's had notice of plaintiffs' intent to appeal the discovery order since plaintiffs sought review of the entire judgment and argued the merits of the discovery order in their opening appellate brief. Having found that we have jurisdiction to review this issue, we must next determine whether the District Court abused its discretion in limiting discovery to “what promises, if any, were made by defendant prior to and at the final audition ․ in New York City that the person selected at that audition would appear in the role as Annie.” App. Plaintiffs contend that the District Court abused its discretion by unduly limiting discovery to preclude them from obtaining information relevant to their fraudulent misrepresentation claims. General Motors Corp., 786 F.2d 564, 568 (3d Cir.1986). The district court concluded, and I agree, that Joanna Pacitti received the benefit of her bargain with Macy's. Because the District Court relied heavily on the official rules in rendering its decision, we provide them here in full:1.See Polonski, 137 F.3d at 144 (stating that “the appellate proceedings clearly manifest an intent to appeal”); see also Canady v. We review the District Court's discovery order for abuse of discretion. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide, in pertinent part: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party․ The information sought need not be admissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Because I do not believe that her contract with Macy's was subject to the interpretation urged by Plaintiffs, I must respectfully dissent. The Actors' Equity Association requires producers to attach its standard “Agreement and Rules Governing Employment under the Production Contract” to “all contracts where production is bonded as a Bus and Truck Tour.” See App. As we discuss below, that contract provides, among other things, that the producer retains the authority to replace the actor at any time so long as the actor is compensated through the term of the contract. All participants must be accompanied by a parent or legal guardian and must bring completed application forms to one of the Macy's audition locations on the dates and times listed on the reverse of this form and be prepared to audition. High Street West Chester, PA 19382 Counsel for Appellants ROBERT P. SAUNDERSMorgan, Brown & Joy, LLPOne Boston Place, Suite 1616 Boston, MA 02108-4472 JAMES M. Obermayer Rebmann Maxwell & Hippel LLPOne Penn Center-19th Floor 1617 John F. Hence, the District Court found that “Plaintiffs could not reasonably have relied upon Macy's as the selector of ‘Annie’ or as a controller of the Producers,” id., and that “it was obvious that Macy's was promoting auditions for the benefit of the Annie Producers.” Id. The District Court also found that plaintiffs “knew that while Macy's was promoting the search, it was not the entity that would be contracting with the new ‘Annie.’ ” Id. Rather, the District Court noted, plaintiffs “wholly expected” to sign a standard actors' equity contract with the producers and, according to the Court, their expectation is evidenced by the fact that they executed such a contract after Joanna won the Search. The Court explained further: The contract which she signed with the Producers did not guarantee her that she would open on Broadway, but instead considered her to be like every other actor in “Annie” who had won their role through an audition process but could be replaced at the Producers' discretion pursuant to the standard equity contract. Therefore, the District Court rejected plaintiffs' contention that Macy's offered Joanna a guaranteed Broadway opening, see id.Annie goes on the road this fall and opens on Broadway Spring 1997. The application form announced: Annie, America's most beloved musical[,] and Macy's, the world's largest store, are conducting a talent search for a new “Annie” to star in the 20th Anniversary Broadway production and national Tour of Annie․Id. The reverse side of the application form contained the “Official Rules [of] Macy's Search for Broadway's New ‘Annie.’ ” See id. In addition to explaining the two-part audition process, the official rules provided, in relevant part:1. The offer to award a prize results in an enforceable contract if the offeree performs the required action before the offer is withdrawn. Here, the parties entered into an enforceable contract under Pennsylvania law. ” From these assertions, one reasonably could conclude that Macy's offered the winner of the Search the prize of starring as “Annie” on Broadway.Macy's publicized the event by placing balloons, signs, pins, and other promotional materials advertising “Macy's Search for Broadway's New ‘Annie’ ” throughout the store. Pacitti participating in “Macy's Search for Broadway's New Annie.” ․ When the Producers offered a contract to Plaintiffs consistent with the terms of the Official Rules[,] any possible obligation Macy's had to Plaintiffs was fully met. After rejecting plaintiffs' breach of contract claim, the District Court turned to their tort claims. Reasoning that each cause of action was predicated upon the assertion that Macy's offered Joanna the role of “Annie” on Broadway, and concluding that Macy's made no such representation, the District Court granted Macy's motion for summary judgment on these claims as well. If the contract as a whole is susceptible to more than one reading, the factfinder resolves the matter. On the other hand, where it is unambiguous and can be interpreted only one way, the court interprets the contract as a matter of law. In determining whether a contract is ambiguous, the court “assumes the intent of the parties to an instrument is ‘embodied in the writing itself, and when the words are clear and unambiguous the intent is to be discovered only from the express language of the agreement.’ ” Id. Further, Macy's at no point revealed-either through its printed materials or other means-that the winner of the Search would receive only the opportunity to sign a standard actors' equity contract with the producers. For these reasons, we hold that the contractual language is ambiguous, and its interpretation should be left to the factfinder for resolution. With respect to the tort causes of action, plaintiffs maintain that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment. We have reviewed orders not specified in the notice of appeal where: (1) there is a connection between the specified and unspecified order, (2) the intention to appeal the unspecified order is apparent, and (3) the opposing party is not prejudiced and has a full opportunity to brief the issues. To succeed on a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation under Pennsylvania law, plaintiffs must establish the following elements: (1) a misrepresentation, (2) a fraudulent utterance, (3) an intention to induce action on the part of the recipient, (4) a justifiable reliance by the recipient upon the misrepresentation, and (5) damage to the recipient as a proximate result. We also find it noteworthy that Macy's submitted its contract with the producers in support of summary judgment. Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court erred in limiting discovery. For the reasons discussed above, we reverse the grant of summary judgment on all claims and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.After auditioning hundreds of “Annie” hopefuls, the producers selected Joanna as the regional finalist. We do not believe that Macy's role was so “obvious” that it need not have limited its offer to public, and we find it telling that Macy's contract with the producers contained qualifications on the prize to be offered. Accordingly, the District Court erred in concluding that Macy's is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Macy's also contends that plaintiffs' claims are barred by the express release in the official rules. That paragraph simply releases Macy's from liability “with respect to the audition(s).” It does not allow Macy's to escape liability arising from this action. As noted above, the District Court dismissed these claims because it had rejected the predicate upon which each claim was based, i.e., that Macy's offered the successful participant the role of “Annie” on Broadway. Because we conclude that the contract reasonably may be interpreted to make such an offer, we reverse on these claims as well and remand for further proceedings. We now turn to plaintiffs' contention that the District Court abused its discretion by limiting the scope of discovery. See Polonski, 137 F.3d at 144 (exercising jurisdiction over order granting attorney's fees even though notice of appeal specified only the order granting summary judgment); Tabron, 6 F.3d at 153 n. As previously noted, the federal rules permit discovery of, among other things, “any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party ․” Fed. We also reverse and remand for plaintiffs to conduct discovery consistent with this opinion.
Joanna and her mother signed the official rules and proceeded to the initial audition at the King of Prussia store. at *4, and the Court concluded: Plaintiffs received the benefit of their bargain by being offered a contract with the Producers for the “Annie” role, in exchange for Ms. In their notice of appeal, plaintiffs state only that they appeal from the District Court's order granting summary judgment for Macy's. In so doing, we evaluate the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. [or] the condition of admitting two or more meanings, of being understood in more than one way, or referring to two or more things at the same time․”). Rather, that clause can be interpreted more narrowly as only restricting Macy's from selecting the winner of the auditions. Commw.1985) (“The intention of the parties must control the interpretation of the contract but if the intent is unclear from the words of the contract, we may examine extrinsic evidence including consideration of the subject matter of the contract, the circumstances surrounding its execution and the subsequent acts of the parties.”); see also In re Estate of Herr, 400 Pa. Joanna's contract with the producers, however, does not demonstrate plainly and unambiguously that when plaintiffs contracted with Macy's, they “wholly expected” to execute a standard actors' equity contract with the producers. Ed.2d 52 (1998) ( “[Liberal] treatment is particularly appropriate where the order appealed is discretionary and relates back to the judgment sought to be reviewed.”); Tabron v. 2 (3d Cir.1993) (“[W]e construe notices of appeal liberally as covering unspecified prior orders if they are related to the specified order that was appealed from.”); Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure, Jurisdiction 3d § 3949.4 (“[A] notice of appeal that names the final judgment is sufficient to support review of all earlier orders that merge in the final judgment under the general rule that appeal from a final judgment supports review of all earlier interlocutory orders.”). 451 (1947)); see also Wright, Miller & Marcus, Federal Practice & Procedure, Civil 2d § 2007 (“The rule does allow broad scope to discovery and this has been well recognized by the courts.”). Plaintiffs seek production of the following: (1) Macy's communications with, and relationship to, the producers regarding the terms of the contract that the producers intended to offer the successful contestant and (2) the pecuniary benefit Macy's received as a result of the Search. Thus, we conclude that the discovery sought here is directly relevant to the subject matter of this dispute. The fact that plaintiffs were not privy to the information that Macy's possessed when Joanna relied on its representations and participated in the Search forms the very basis of plaintiffs' fraudulent misrepresentation claims.In a press release, Macy's announced Joanna's success to the public: “One in Ten She'll Be a Star! Therefore, we conclude that it was reasonable for plaintiffs to believe that Macy's offered the starring role of “Annie” on Broadway. The official rules provide, in pertinent part:[Y]ou and your parent or legal guardian are responsible for your own conduct, and hereby release Macy's ․ and the Producers ․ from any liability to or with regard to the participants and/or her parent or legal guardian with respect to the audition(s). Specifically, plaintiffs argue that the District Court's discovery order precluded them from uncovering facts relevant to their fraudulent misrepresentation claims. And we have explained: “[S]ince ․ only a final judgment or order is appealable, the appeal from a final judgment draws in question all prior non-final orders and rulings.” Drinkwater, 904 F.2d at 858 (exercising jurisdiction over unspecified order because finality doctrine barred plaintiff from appealing that order until after the entry of final judgment) (citing Elfman Motors, Inc. Chrysler Corp., 567 F.2d 1252, 1253 (3d Cir.1977) (per curiam)); see also Polonski v. 2 (reviewing order denying request for counsel even though notice of appeal specified only the order granting summary judgment). The discovery order is sufficiently related to the order granting summary judgment. I cannot agree that the district judge erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Macy's.